Abstract: This paper assesses some of the explanations that have been put forward for the global pattern of current account imbalances that has emerged in recent years: in particular, the large U.S. current account deficit and the large surpluses of the Asian developing economies. Based on the approach developed by Chinn and Prasad (2003), we use data for 61 countries during 1982-2003 to estimate panel regression models for the ratio of the current account balance to GDP. We find that a model that includes as its explanatory variables the standard determinants of current accounts proposed in the literature-per capita income, relative growth rates, the fiscal balance, demographic variables, and economic openness-can account for neither the large U.S. deficit nor large Asian surpluses of the 1997-2003 period. However, when we include a variable representing financial crises, which might be expected to restrain domestic demand and boost the current account balance, the model explains much of developing Asia's swing into surplus since 1997. Even so, the model cannot explain why the capital outflows associated with Asia's current account surpluses were channeled primarily into the U.S. economy. Observers have pointed to strong growth performance and a favorable institutional environment as elements attracting foreign investment into the United States, and we found strong evidence that good performance in these areas significantly reduces the current account balance. While a model incorporating these factors still fails to predict the large U.S. current account deficit (and, in fact, predicts a slight surplus), it does predict a U.S. current account balance that is relatively weaker than the aggregate balance of developing Asia.
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I. Introduction
The pattern of global current account imbalances has received considerable attention in recent years. Most prominently, the U.S. current account deficit has widened from $125 billion in 1995 to $668 billion in 2004 (shown in Figure 1 ), or from 1.5 percent of GDP to 5.7 percent of GDP. This deficit is mirrored in some equally marked surpluses on the part of some of the United
States' trading partners. The current account balances of major developing East Asian economies (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand) have moved from an aggregate deficit of $27 billion in 1995 to a surplus of $186 billion in 2004, or from negative 1.2 percent of GDP to positive 5.3 percent of GDP. More generally, the aggregate current account balance of the developing countries moved into surplus starting in 2000.
The present pattern of external imbalances appears inconsistent with the standard view that mature industrial economies should be exporting capital to poor developing countries. Because developing countries have higher labor/capital ratios, they should in principle have higher marginal productivities of capital and thus attract capital from labor-poor industrial economies. Moreover, if developing countries can expect faster income growth as they catch up to industrial countries, this provides an incentive for them to borrow against their higher future income, also leading to current account deficits.
There is no consensus explanation for the current pattern of international capital flows, and many hypotheses have been put forward: U.S. fiscal deficits; declines in U.S. private saving; the surge in U.S. productivity growth; increases in global financial intermediation; a global savings glut; a rash of emerging market financial crises; and exchange rate pegs by our trading partners.
However, many of these factors are quite amorphous, and it has been difficult to muster support for one explanation against another.
2 By the same token, it has been even more difficult to assess all of the proposed factors jointly and compare their separate contributions to the international pattern of current account imbalances. Ferguson (2005) reports one of the few attempts to conduct such as exercise. The
Federal Reserve staff's open economy macroeconomic simulation model is used to gauge the contribution of different shocks to the evolution of the U.S. trade deficit. The widening of the deficit is attributed primarily to the rise in U.S. productivity growth, a fall in the risk premium on dollar assets, and the weakening of foreign domestic demand; other factors, including the U.S. fiscal deficit and decline in private saving, receive less weight in the decomposition analysis. This exercise is undeniably useful in enhancing our understanding of the roots of the U.S. trade deficit.
Nevertheless, the simulation model is unlikely to precisely capture the economic linkages involved in the determination of the external balance, and identifying the quantitative magnitude of the shocks affecting the trade deficit is both difficult and subjective.
In this paper, we adopt a more empirical but less structured approach to explaining the recent emergence of large current account imbalances. Our approach jumps off from the influential research of Chinn and Prasad (2003) . 1 Chinn and Prasad developed a large multi-country database for the period 1971-1995 and estimated a battery of cross-sectional and panel regressions relating current account/GDP ratios to a wide range of potential determinants, including, among others, the fiscal deficit, net foreign asset position, per capita income, output growth, demographic variables, terms of trade volatility, and openness to trade. Based on a similar approach, but with altered specifications and data extending through 2003, we estimate panel regression models to explain the current account/GDP ratios of 61 countries. We use these models to assess preliminary hypotheses regarding the determinants of current account balances, and we also assess the extent to which our models can explain the international pattern of current account balances that has emerged in recent years, particularly the U.S. deficit and developing Asian surpluses.
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To summarize our key results, we find that a regression model comprised of the standard determinants of the current account identified in the literature-per capita income, output growth, fiscal balances, net foreign assets, economic openness, and demographic variables-can explain neither the large U.S. current account deficit of recent years nor the large developing Asian surpluses. This tends to confirm suspicions that whatever is causing these outsized external imbalances, it is something not readily explained by conventional theory.
However, a variant of our standard model that is augmented by a variable representing the incidence of financial crisis does do a good job of explaining the emergence of developing Asia's current account surpluses. Financial crises persistently restrain both the supply and demand for credit, depressing domestic demand and boosting external balances. The financial crises in developing Asia in the late 1990s apparently played a key role in promoting surpluses, both directly by restraining domestic spending, particularly investment, and, perhaps, indirectly by encouraging the authorities to take measures to keep their exchange rates competitive.
Even though our augmented model can explain why the Asian economies moved into surplus, it does not explain why the U.S. economy moved so deep into deficit. (In fact, the model predicts a small surplus for the United States in the recent period.) Put another way, the financial crisis that swept developing Asia in the late 1990s apparently contributed to the subsequent substantial capital outflows from that region, and thus to what Bernanke (2005) has referred to as a 4 "global savings glut". However, it remains unclear why those surplus savings ended up in the United States rather than being spread more evenly throughout the world.
Analysts have posited several factors that could account for investors' special attraction to U.S. assets in recent years, including the United States' strong growth, reliable investor protections, and market-friendly regulations. We find that in many specifications of our model, a variable representing the change in output growth significantly lowers the current account balance.
Additionally, favorable scores on measures of the quality of government institutions are associated with statistically significant reductions in current account balances. Even so, our model fails to predict the substantial U.S. current account deficits of recent years, and still predicts a small surplus.
While the model does poorly at predicting the actual magnitude of the U.S. current account deficit it does correctly predict a weaker balance in recent years for the United States than for the developing Asian economies in aggregate. Better institutions in the United States, in combination with slowing growth and the financial crisis in Asia, lead the model to predict relatively higher current account balances in Asia than in the United States, even taking into account the United
States' much higher level of economic development.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section II reviews different explanations that have been put forward for the emergence of large external imbalances in recent years. Section III describes the methodology and data used to develop panel regression models of the current account/GDP ratio. The estimation results and the ability of the basic model to predict current account balances are addressed in Section IV, while Section V focuses on the role of government institutions in the determination of the current account. Section VI addresses the robustness of our estimates to alternative specifications, while section VII concludes.
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II. Explanations for the Pattern of Large External Imbalances
The proximate causes of the widening of the U.S. current account deficit and corresponding widening of our trading partners' deficits are reasonably obvious: the rise in the dollar between 1995 and early 2002 (which has given up only part of its gains since then); the pickup in U.S. real GDP growth relative to that of its trading partners; and the higher elasticity of U.S. imports with respect to income than U.S. exports with respect to foreign income (the Houthakker-Magee effect).
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Yet, listing these proximate factors leaves open the more fundamental causes of the deficit. What caused the appreciation of the dollar? Why has U.S. growth translated into so much more imports than has foreign growth? This section reviews some of the answers to these deeper questions.
Expansion of the fiscal deficit
The simultaneous emergence of fiscal and current account deficits in the United States in the mid-1990s gave rise to the "twin deficits" hypothesis.
(See, among others, Truman, 2004, and Gramlich, 2004.) At its simplest, this hypothesis notes that the current account balance is equal to saving minus investment, so any expansion of the fiscal deficit that lowers public saving must lower the current account balance. In the more sophisticated version of the hypothesis, which takes into account the endogeneity of private saving and investment decisions, fiscal expansion boosts domestic spending, pushing up domestic interest rates relative to foreign rates; this attracts foreign investors and buoys the dollar, thereby widening the current account deficit. Some observers see the U.S. budget deficit as an important factor in the economy's external imbalance. (Cline, 2005 , Chinn, 2005 , Chinn and Ito, 2005 However, analysis using simulation models suggests that the budget deficit may not have played a central role (Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust, 2005a, Ferguson, 2005) .
3 See, among others, Chinn (2004) , Mann (1999 ), and Roubini and Setzer (2004 . 2. Declines in private saving rates Since the mid-1990s, the U.S. personal saving rate has moved down from about 5 percent of disposable income to below 2 percent, while the gross private saving rate, which also incorporates corporate saving, has also declined a bit. Along with the slide in public saving rates, the decline in private saving could help to explain the widening of the current account deficit. However, it is not clear whether the decline in saving is autonomous, perhaps reflecting financial innovations that have made it easier for Americans to borrow, or the endogenous response to other developments; for example, Bernanke (2005) argues that an excess of saving abroad has simultaneously boosted the U.S. current account deficit and depressed U.S. private saving. Additionally, even an autonomous decline in saving might have little impact on the current account balance. In the model simulation described in Ferguson (2005) , a decline in private saving, by boosting interest rates, crowds out investment more than it crowds in net exports.
U.S. productivity surge
The growth rate of U.S. labor productivity rose from some 1½ percent annually in the 1975-95 period to about 3 percent subsequently. This increase likely boosted perceived rates of return on U.S. assets, generating capital inflows and buoying the dollar.
Expectations of higher rates of return likely also motivated greater domestic investment, and consumption may have been supported by increases in stock prices and perceived long-run income.
As shown in simulation experiments described in Erceg, Gust, and Guerrieri (2005b) and Ferguson (2005) , all these developments may have contributed to larger trade deficits.
Expanding global financial intermediation
In recent years, the correlation between national saving and investment rates-the so-called Feldstein-Horioka paradox-has declined, suggesting that savings are being used to finance investment to a greater extent than in the past Giavazzi, 2002, and . Additionally, there is considerable evidence that the extent of home bias in portfolio allocation-that is, the tendency for portfolios to be 7 overweight domestic assets-is declining (Ahearne et. al., 2004) . Greenspan (2003) has suggested that these trends signal improvements in international financial intermediation which allow larger external imbalances to be financed than in the past, an observation that is consistent with recent increases in the absolute value of global current account deficits, shown in Figure 2 . Analyses by Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) and Edwards (2005) also accord a role to reduced home bias in the widening of U.S. deficits.
However, the increased ability of the international financial system to move capital across borders does not, by itself, mean that it is the United States that would be expected to exploit that improved ability. Observers point to various strengths of the U.S. economy-its favorable investment climate, protections of investor rights, and solid rates of return-as making it likely that the United States would attract international capital once it became available. Bernanke (2005) argues that the large U.S. current account deficit owes importantly to a surge in the availability of saving from overseas. He notes that much of the increased flow of foreign saving has come from developing countries, a development he attributes in large part to the series of financial crises experienced in the past decade. Emerging market financial crises may generate current account surpluses (or lower deficits) through several channels: the economy may lose access to foreign credit; financial intermediation within the economy may become obstructed, causing a credit crunch; balance sheet problems among firms and consumers may restrain domestic spending; and authorities may respond to the weakness in domestic demand by taking actions to keep the exchange rate competitive so as to maintain external demand. As discussed in Kamin (2005) and shown in Figures 3a through 3d, all of those factors, to greater and lesser degrees, were involved in the Asian developing countries' swing into surplus: investment rates collapsed, along with bank lending, while exchange rates 8 remained weak against the dollar, even as the currencies of foreign industrial economies were appreciating.
Global savings glut/emerging market financial crises
Of course, as in the increased global financial intermediation story, the increased flows of capital from developing countries cannot, by themselves, explain the rise in the U.S. current account deficit-in principle, other industrial economies might also have increased their net imports of capital. Again, to explain the rise in U.S. deficits, one must suggest why investors found the United
States to be a particularly attractive target for their funds.
Developing Asian exchange rate intervention
Whether described as the "revived Bretton Woods system" (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2003 and or "codependency" (Mann, 2004) , one explanation put forward for the large U.S. current account deficits is, simply, that some of our trading partners (mainly Asian) have been intervening to keep their currencies competitive and promote their own growth. In principle, this explanation does not differ greatly from the savings glut/financial crisis story in #5, above. Mann, for example, cites the late 1990s financial crises as a key factor in the exchange rate policies of the developing Asian economies, suggesting that at some future point those policies may change. Dooley, FolkertsLandau, and Garber, however, argue that intervention to keep exchange rates competitive and produce current account surpluses is in the interest of all developing countries, with the implication that such surpluses may be with us for some time to come. They do not explain why the developing countries apparently waited until 1999 to adopt such a strategy. 
Rising oil prices
III. Empirical Methodology and Data
Our empirical research will not be able to shed light on all of the potential explanations for the large U.S. current account deficit surveyed above. It should, however, bear on at least some of those stories.
Our sample consists of observations on 61 countries over the period between 1982 and 2003.
Since our primary interest is the medium and long term determinants of current account balances, we consider multi-year averages of annual observations as in Chinn and Prasad (2003) . 4 Averages were constructed over 1982 -1986, 1987 -1991, 1992 -1996, and 1997 -2003 , giving us four period observations for each of our 61 cross-sections. For some series a lagged observation was created based on the 1977 -1981 average. In cases of missing annual observations, averages were calculated based on the remaining years in a period, allowing a larger sample of developing countries than would have otherwise been possible.
Our primary method of analysis consists of panel regressions with the ratio of the current account balance to GDP as the dependent variable. For all of the regressions we include a period fixed effect, thereby allowing the average current account balance across the cross-section to vary from period to period. We do not include country fixed effects, since allowing country-specific means would prevent us from analyzing cross-country differences in current accounts.
To calculate the current account to GDP ratio, we use the current account measured in U.S.
dollars and GDP converted to dollars at the annual average market exchange rate. Using ratios controls for nominal changes in current accounts and GDP.
We briefly review the explanatory variables in our models below. In that the current account is inherently a relative measure, most of the independent variables were calculated as ratios to sample averages.
Per capita income As noted above, economic theory predicts that labor-intensive capitalpoor developing countries should be net importers of capital, and hence run current account deficits, while capital-rich developed countries should export capital and run current surpluses. To capture this dynamic, we include the ratio of real per capita income to its sample mean in our regressions.
Changes in growth rates
An increase in the growth rate of productivity relative to other countries should be associated with a larger current account balance, as an increase in the return on capital increases investment and the potential for higher future income decreases saving. In our model, changes in productivity growth are proxied by the change in the growth rate of real per capita income; this measure is available for many countries, although it does not control for changes in labor force participation or hours worked. The growth rates were constructed as the multi-year average of the difference of annual growth from the GDP-weighted sample mean. In some regressions, we control for changes in labor force participation by using per employee GDP rather than per capita GDP.
Fiscal balance The fiscal balance was calculated as a ratio to GDP and expressed as the difference from the mean GDP-weighted ratio for the sample.
Net foreign assets A country's net foreign asset (NFA) position directly affects its net investment income, and therefore its current account balance. Because the NFA position is, in 11 effect, the accumulation of past current account balances, the lagged value of the position, expressed as a ratio to GDP, is entered into the regressions to avoid correlation with the independent variable. The lack of NFA data for a number of countries, including Hong Kong, led us to substitute the lagged current account in some regressions; these measures are highly correlated.
Additionally, as shown in , the inclusion of the lagged current account can be theoretically justified if consumers exhibit habit formation.
Demographics The life-cycle theory of consumption and saving predicts that young households borrow, middle-age households save for retirement, and households in retirement dissave. Therefore relatively young and relatively old countries are both more likely to run current account deficits. To capture these effects we included both the youth dependency ratio and the oldage dependency ratio in the regressions. The youth dependency ratio was defined as the ratio of the population ages 0 -14 to the working age population (ages 15 -64), while the old-age dependency ratio was defined as the ratio of the population 65 and older to the working age population. Both measures were entered as deviations from a GDP-weighted sample mean.
Openness Openness was identified by Chinn and Prasad (2003) as a potential determinant of the current account. We define openness as the sum of imports and exports relative to GDP.
Oil Balance In order to capture the effect on current accounts of terms-of-trade shocks related to oil prices, we included the nominal oil balance to GDP ratio in the regressions. Although the oil balance is a component of the overall current account balance, changes in the oil balance do not have a one-for-one impact on the current account balance if the non-oil balance also responds to oil price shocks. As shown in figure 10 , the relationship between the two balances is surprisingly indistinct. It is important to note that our sample ends in 2003, and thus misses much of the recent upward swing in oil prices.
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Financial crises Our financial crisis variable is based on a list of banking crises developed by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) , who identify a banking crisis by the extent to which bank capital in a country is exhausted. Crises are categorized as systemic or non-systemic, depending on how widespread capital losses are. We consider only crises flagged by Caprio and Klingebiel as being systemic. 5 As the first step in constructing our financial crises variable, we construct a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if a country is in crisis and zero otherwise.
As with many other of the explanatory variables we consider, a financial crisis should affect a particular country's current account only in relative terms. If all countries in the sample were simultaneously in crisis, one would not expect there to be an impact on any one country's current account balance. Accordingly, the financial crisis variable we use in our model is a relative measure; it is constructed by subtracting from the value of each country's annual zero-one financial crisis dummy a GDP-weighted average of these dummies, aggregated across all the countries in our In addition to the financial crisis variable, we also include as an explanatory variable in our model an interaction term, the financial crisis variable multiplied by the openness variable. The 5 Our one deviation from the Caprio and Klingebiel list is that their list identified China having a banking crisis in the "1990s", but given that the country's banking problems have not been resolved, we extend that crisis through the present.
13 rationale for this is that more open economies are likely to have larger tradable goods sectors and thus be able to adjust their external balances more flexibly in response to financial crisis. 6 Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the financial crises in the Caprio and Klingbiel dataset are measures of banking crises, not currency crises such as those identified by Frankel and Rose (1996) or Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) , although there may be considerable overlaps among the two concepts. It would be inappropriate to use currency crises per se in our model.
Such measures often signal a sharp exchange rate depreciation, thus representing a proximate determinant of the current account rather than a more fundamental factor. Moreover, currency crises often reflect sharp reversals of capital flows, but such reversals are the capital-account counterparts to swings of the current account, not an independent cause of them.
Quality of government institutions
As noted above, one explanation for the attractiveness of the United States to foreign investors is the quality of U.S. institutions, which both protects investor rights and enhances rates of return. In order to capture the importance of institutions to capital flows, we include a set of governance indicators described in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) , in a subset of our regressions. 7 The Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi data set consists of six indicators (Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption) with four annual observations (1996, 1998, 2000, 6 For example, consider two economies, both with trade deficits of 5 percent of GDP, and both of whom experience declines in imports and increases in exports of 10 percent following a financial crisis.
In a very open economy-say, with imports of 60 percent of GDP and exports of 55 percentimports would fall to 54 percent of GDP and exports would rise to 60.5 percent of GDP, causing the trade balance to swing to a surplus of 6.5 percent of GDP. Conversely, in a more closed economysay, with imports of 20 percent of GDP and exports of 15 percent-the trade deficit would narrow but not close entirely.
7 Introducing institutional measures into a cross-country model of current accounts is novel; the only other research we are aware of that does this is Chinn and Ito (2005) . They use different measures of institutional quality, drawn from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Table 1 presents the estimation results for several variants of our model. As described above, the model is estimated over data organized into period-averages for four different periods: 1982-1986, 1987-1991, 1992-1996, and 1997-2003 The coefficient on the fiscal balance variable is quite low, at .11; however, our estimate is not all that far from many of the coefficients estimated by Chinn and Prasad (2003) , Chinn and Ito (2005) or Bussiere, Fratzscher, and Muller (2004, 2005) , which range from less than 0.1 to a little over 0.4.
IV. Basic Estimation Results
The coefficient on output growth also is low and insignificant, but this is consistent with Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Chinn and Ito (2005) , who use a slightly different specification.
Bussiere, Fratzcher, and Muller (2005) find a larger and significant negative impact on the current account, but using productivity growth rather than output growth and using data only for industrial economies. (See, also, Glick and Rogoff, 1995.) As shown in the first column of Table 6 , using a more specific measure of productivity--output per employee rather than output per capita-for the entire sample of industrial and developing countries for which data are available does not improve these results; as using the productivity measure requires shrinking the number of observations, we stick with the output measure for use in our model. Importantly, while the models in columns 3 and 4 explain much of the Asian current account surpluses in recent years, they offer no improved ability to predict the U.S. deficit; as with the models that do not include the financial crises variables, they continue to predict U.S. balances that are about 4½ percentage points of GDP too high. This is confirmed in column 5, where only a dummy variable for the United States in the 1997-2003 period is included, and it shows an overprediction of over 5 percentage points of GDP.
V. Institutional Quality and the U.S. Current Account Balance
To improve the model's ability to capture the factors underlying foreign investors' strong attraction to the United States in recent years, we added to the model the composite indicator of the quality of government institutions outlined in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) . As described in Section III, above, this measure is an average of six separate sub-indexes: voice; political stability; government effectiveness; regulatory burden; rule of law; and corruption. This measure is only available biennially for 1996 onwards, and thus requires restricting estimation of the model to the last two panels: 1991-95 and 1997-2003. In order to provide a baseline against which to compare results, columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 replicate the model shown in columns 3 and 5 of Because only some of the sub-indexes in the composite indicator of government institutions may affect the current account balance, Table 3 Nevertheless, as indicated by the coefficient on the U.S. dummy in column 2, even with the government institutions variable disaggregated into its component parts, the model still substantially overpredicts the U.S. current account deficit (although the error is less than without any governance indicators, as shown in Table 2 , column 2). Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 remove all of the subindexes except for the measure of regulatory burden, but this has little effect on the model.
8 Chinn and Ito (2005) find similar results to hold, mainly of the high-income subset of their country dataset.
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Based on the model shown in Table 2, and the Philippines, suggesting that the poor institutional environment in these countries supports capital outflows and therefore current account surpluses.
The last two columns of Figure 9 compare the predicted and actual current accounts for the Asian aggregate and the United States in 1997-2003. As has been noted earlier, the model predicts 22 a considerably stronger current account for the United States --one that is in slight surplus --than actually occurred. Nevertheless, the model successfully predicts a weaker current account balance for the United States than for the Asian aggregate, despite the United States' much higher per capita income. This result is driven, among other factors, by the positive impact of slowing growth and the financial crisis on the Asian balances and the negative impact of institutional quality on the U.S.
balance.
VI. Robustness to Alternative Specifications
The remaining tables in the paper present estimates of the model under alternative specifications. The key features of the results shown in Tables 1 -3 remain largely unchanged.
In Table 4 , the net foreign asset position variable in the model is replaced by the average current account balance in the prior period. The results for most of the other coefficients, including on the dummy variables, are quite similar to those in Table 1 , although far fewer coefficients are significantly different than zero. Notably, the coefficients on the financial crisis variables remain significant.
Tables 5a (using net foreign assets) and 5b (using lagged current accounts) present estimates that include Singapore in the sample. As indicated in Table 5a , including Singapore in the sample substantially reduces the size and significance of the financial crisis variables, likely reflecting Singapore's extremely large and persistent current account surpluses over the past 1½ decades, even as it has stayed out of financial crisis. However, in Table 5b , where the model includes lagged current account balances instead of net foreign asset positions, those variable are again significant.
In Table 6 , the variable representing the change in output growth is replaced by the change in the growth of labor productivity (output per employee). Columns 1 and 2 present the model estimates for all four periods. As noted above, the coefficient on this variable fails to come in with Table 2 , the growth variable is now significant, and the fit of the model is somewhat better.
However, the large U.S. current account deficit remains unexplained, and the number of observations is substantially reduced owing to lack of data on employment for many countries.
VII. Conclusion
Turning back to the review of the different proposed explanations for the global pattern of current account imbalances in Section II, our empirical work sheds light on several of these explanations.
First, our work provides support for at least half of the global savings glut hypothesis (#5 above): the half suggesting that the U.S. deficit owes partly to an autonomous rise in the quantity of saving made available to the United States by its trading partners. In particular, our estimation results indicate that financial crises systematically lead to higher current account imbalances, and that the wave of crises that swept the developing world in the late 1990s, especially in East Asia, contributed to their shift into current account surplus.
This finding tends to undercut a related explanation for the East Asian surpluses (#6 above), that they reflect the rational development strategy of East Asian governments and can be expected to persist for a long time as part of a "revived Bretton Woods system." If keeping currencies competitive to achieve current account surpluses is good long-term development strategy, why did the East Asian economies wait until the late 1990s to start implementing this strategy, why did this implementation coincide so neatly with their financial crises, and why haven't economies in other regions in recent decades also adopted this strategy? In fact, our sense is that, with much of 24 developing Asia's surpluses explained by prior financial crises, these surpluses will likely dissipate as adjustments following those crises are completed. This would restore the net flow of capital from industrial economies back to developing economies, consistent with standard theory.
Second, for the global saving glut story to explain the large U.S. current account deficit, however, some explanation must be posited for why the increase in global savings availability was tapped primarily by the United States. Our research provides mixed support for the explanations that have been advanced (some of which, in principle, could operate even without an autonomous rise in foreign saving). The expansion of the U.S. budget deficit (#1, above) does not appear to explain the U.S. current account deficit, at least for the 1997-2003 period; not only is the estimated pass-through of the fiscal balance to the current account quite small, at about 0.1, but the average budget balance during this period was relatively positive by international standards. The view that current account deficits can be caused both by strong economic performance (#2, above) and by a market-friendly institutional environment (#4, #5) was well-supported by our research; we found that the pace of output growth generally exerted a significant negative effect on the current account balance, as did the quality of government institutions, particularly the regulatory regime. But even though the U.S. economy compared favorably to other economies along these dimensions, our model fails to explain the emergence of the large U.S. current account deficit.
The model's prediction for the United States is more successful in relative than in absolute terms. It is able to capture the weakness of the U.S. current account relative to that of the developing Asian countries, despite the pull of capital from mature industrial economies to developing economies identified by conventional theory. The financial crisis and deceleration of growth push up the model's prediction of developing Asia's current account, while the quality of U.S. institutions pushes down the model's prediction of the U.S. current account balance. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) Financial Crisis Indicators Caprio and Klingbiel (2003) Oil: Imports, Exports, and Prices Energy Information Agency -Department of Energy (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) 0.016 0.033 0.378 0.874 Indonesia(1997 Indonesia( -2003 0.053 0.032 3.754
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